2026 Mali attacks

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Background

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== Background == == Background == Mali has been embroiled in a civil war since 2012, initiated by a loose coalition of secular Tuareg rebels from the [[National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad]] (MNLA) and Tuareg-dominated jihadist groups, {{Failed verification span|text=including [[Iyad Ag Ghali]]'s [[Ansar Dine]], [[Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb]]|date=April 2026}}, and others.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Mason|first=Shane|title=Why France Failed in Mali|date=2022-02-21|url=https://warontherocks.com/why-france-failed-in-mali/|access-date=2026-04-25|website=War on the Rocks|language=en-US}}</ref> In January 2012, these groups launched an offensive on predominantly Tuareg towns in [[Kidal Region]] and [[Ménaka Region]], capturing both regional capitals.{{Citation needed|date=April 2026}} By April, the Islamist groups had seized control of [[Gao]], [[Timbuktu]], and the remainder of northern Mali.{{Citation needed|date=April 2026}} The offensive prompted Malian officers to overthrow President [[Amadou Toumani Touré]] and seek French intervention via [[Operation Serval]], which routed the jihadists at Konna and reversed the gains made by the Islamist faction of the alliance.{{Citation needed|date=April 2026}} Mali has been embroiled in a civil war since 2012, initiated by a loose coalition of secular Tuareg rebels from the [[National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad]] (MNLA) and Tuareg-dominated jihadist groups, {{Failed verification span|text=including [[Iyad Ag Ghali]]'s [[Ansar Dine]], [[Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb]]|date=April 2026}}, and others.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Mason|first=Shane|title=Why France Failed in Mali|date=2022-02-21|url=https://warontherocks.com/why-france-failed-in-mali/|access-date=2026-04-25|website=War on the Rocks|language=en-US}}</ref> In January 2012, these groups launched an offensive on predominantly Tuareg towns in [[Kidal Region]] and [[Ménaka Region]], capturing both regional capitals.{{Citation needed|date=April 2026}} By April, the Islamist groups had seized control of [[Gao]], [[Timbuktu]], and the remainder of northern Mali.{{Citation needed|date=April 2026}} The offensive prompted Malian officers to overthrow President [[Amadou Toumani Touré]] and seek French intervention via [[Operation Serval]], which routed the jihadists at Konna and reversed the gains made by the Islamist faction of the alliance.{{Citation needed|date=April 2026}} After the signing of the [[Algiers Accords (2015)|Algiers Accords]] between the Malian government and the [[Coordination of Azawad Movements]] in 2015, the implementation of the agreement stalled, and fighting also spread from northern to central Mali.<ref name="BTI-2026">{{Cite web |title=BTI 2026 Mali Country Report |date=2026 |access-date=26 April 2026 |work=[[Bertelsmann Transformation Index]] |url=https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/MLI }}</ref>

After eight years of French and international failure to contain the jihadists, whose remnants formed the al-Qaeda affiliated alliance [[Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin]] in 2017, Mali underwent two coups led by [[Assimi Goïta]], who has led Mali under military rule since 2021.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/16/last-french-troops-leave-mali-ending-nine-year-deployment|title=Last French troops leave Mali, ending nine-year deployment|website=Al Jazeera|date=16 August 2022}}</ref>{{Failed verification|date=April 2026}} Goita's coup inspired similar coups in Niger and Burkina Faso, with the three countries [[French military withdrawal from West Africa (2022–2025)|asking the French to leave]] and forming the [[Alliance of Sahel States]].<ref>{{cite web |title=Mali army says armed 'terrorist' groups attacked military positions |url=https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20260425-mali-army-says-armed-terrorist-groups-attacked-military-positions|publisher=France 24|date=25 April 2026}}</ref>{{Failed verification|date=April 2026}} Mali subsequently requested the assistance of the Russian [[Wagner Group]], resulting in the successful [[Kidal offensive]] in 2023.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2024-02-20|title=Northern Mali: Return to Dialogue {{!}} International Crisis Group|url=https://www.crisisgroup.org/rpt/africa/sahel/mali/314-nord-du-mali-revenir-au-dialogue|access-date=2026-04-25|website=www.crisisgroup.org|language=en}}</ref> Following a setback at the [[Battle of Tinzaouaten (2024)|Battle of Tinzaouaten]] in 2024, where the [[Azawad Liberation Front]] (a descendant of the MNLA)<ref>{{Cite web |date=2024-12-02 |title=Mali: les rebelles du Nord combattent désormais pour l'indépendance et subissent un premier revers |url=https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20241202-mali-rebelles-nord-combattent-d%C3%A9sormais-pour-l-ind%C3%A9pendance-et-subissent-un-premier-revers |access-date=2026-04-25 |website=RFI |language=fr}}</ref> and JNIM attacked Russian and Malian troops, the Wagner Group was replaced by the Russian government-controlled [[Africa Corps (Russia)|Africa Corps]], who have since exploited the country's minerals and killed civilians in areas frequented by the FLA and JNIM.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Russia's Africa Corps and the business of conflict|access-date=2026-04-25|url=https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/russia-africa-corps-business-of-conflict/|website=Global Initiative|language=en}}</ref> Malian president [[Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta]] failed to implement reforms to strengthen the Malian state, and faced accusations of embezzlement and corruption. Foreign military missions such as [[MINUSMA]] and the French-led [[Operation Barkhane]] also failed to fully suppress jihadist groups,<ref name="BTI-2026" /><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/16/last-french-troops-leave-mali-ending-nine-year-deployment|title=Last French troops leave Mali, ending nine-year deployment|website=Al Jazeera|date=16 August 2022}}</ref> whose remnants formed the al-Qaeda affiliated alliance [[Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin]] in 2017. Mali underwent two coups led by [[Assimi Goïta]], who has led Mali under military rule since 2021.{{Failed verification|date=April 2026}} Goita's coup inspired similar coups in Niger and Burkina Faso, with the three countries [[French military withdrawal from West Africa (2022–2025)|asking the French to leave]] and forming the [[Alliance of Sahel States]].<ref>{{cite web |title=Mali army says armed 'terrorist' groups attacked military positions |url=https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20260425-mali-army-says-armed-terrorist-groups-attacked-military-positions|publisher=France 24|date=25 April 2026}}</ref>{{Failed verification|date=April 2026}} Mali subsequently requested the assistance of the Russian [[Wagner Group]], resulting in the successful [[Kidal offensive]] in 2023.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2024-02-20|title=Northern Mali: Return to Dialogue {{!}} International Crisis Group|url=https://www.crisisgroup.org/rpt/africa/sahel/mali/314-nord-du-mali-revenir-au-dialogue|access-date=2026-04-25|website=www.crisisgroup.org|language=en}}</ref> Following a setback at the [[Battle of Tinzaouaten (2024)|Battle of Tinzaouaten]] in 2024, where the [[Azawad Liberation Front]] (a descendant of the MNLA)<ref>{{Cite web |date=2024-12-02 |title=Mali: les rebelles du Nord combattent désormais pour l'indépendance et subissent un premier revers |url=https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20241202-mali-rebelles-nord-combattent-d%C3%A9sormais-pour-l-ind%C3%A9pendance-et-subissent-un-premier-revers |access-date=2026-04-25 |website=RFI |language=fr}}</ref> and JNIM attacked Russian and Malian troops, the Wagner Group was replaced by the Russian government-controlled [[Africa Corps (Russia)|Africa Corps]], who have since exploited the country's minerals and killed civilians in areas frequented by the FLA and JNIM.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Russia's Africa Corps and the business of conflict|access-date=2026-04-25|url=https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/russia-africa-corps-business-of-conflict/|website=Global Initiative|language=en}}</ref>

Following 2024, JNIM opened a new front to isolate [[Bamako]] and other urban areas in western and southern Mali from economic centers and supply lines. The group targeted the mining region of [[Kayes Region|Kayes]] and towns that connect Mali to Senegal, Mauritania, Guinea and Ivory Coast, the primary sources of Malian fuel imports. In July 2025, JNIM launched attacks on the cities of [[Kayes]] and [[Nioro du Sahel]]. In September 2025, JNIM [[Mali fuel blockade|imposed a fuel blockade]] by attacking transport routes from the borders to government-controlled southern cities. As the south houses the majority of Mali's population, food production, and economic centers,<ref name="AfricaCenter20252">{{Cite web |last=Eizenga|first=Daniel|title=JNIM Attacks in Western Mali Reshape Sahel Conflict|work=Africa Center for Strategic Studies|date=29 September 2025|access-date=25 April 2026|url=https://africacenter.org/spotlight/jnim-attacks-western-mali-sahel/}}</ref> the resulting 80% decline in fuel imports crippled the Malian state's ability to function.<ref name="AfricaCenter20252" /><ref>{{Cite web |last=Vandermeersch|first=Sebastian|date=2025-12-03|title=Mali Under Siege: Tracking the Fuel Blockade Crippling Bamako|url=https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2025/12/03/mali-under-siege-tracking-the-fuel-blockade-crippling-bamako/|access-date=2026-04-25|website=bellingcat|language=en-GB}}</ref>{{Failed verification|date=April 2026}} Following 2024, JNIM opened a new front to isolate [[Bamako]] and other urban areas in western and southern Mali from economic centers and supply lines. The group targeted the mining region of [[Kayes Region|Kayes]] and towns that connect Mali to Senegal, Mauritania, Guinea and Ivory Coast, the primary sources of Malian fuel imports. In July 2025, JNIM launched attacks on the cities of [[Kayes]] and [[Nioro du Sahel]]. In September 2025, JNIM [[Mali fuel blockade|imposed a fuel blockade]] by attacking transport routes from the borders to government-controlled southern cities. As the south houses the majority of Mali's population, food production, and economic centers,<ref name="AfricaCenter20252">{{Cite web |last=Eizenga|first=Daniel|title=JNIM Attacks in Western Mali Reshape Sahel Conflict|work=Africa Center for Strategic Studies|date=29 September 2025|access-date=25 April 2026|url=https://africacenter.org/spotlight/jnim-attacks-western-mali-sahel/}}</ref> the resulting 80% decline in fuel imports crippled the Malian state's ability to function.<ref name="AfricaCenter20252" /><ref>{{Cite web |last=Vandermeersch|first=Sebastian|date=2025-12-03|title=Mali Under Siege: Tracking the Fuel Blockade Crippling Bamako|url=https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2025/12/03/mali-under-siege-tracking-the-fuel-blockade-crippling-bamako/|access-date=2026-04-25|website=bellingcat|language=en-GB}}</ref>{{Failed verification|date=April 2026}}