Haldane Mission

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← Previous revision Revision as of 15:42, 27 April 2026 Line 33: Line 33: == Haldane in Berlin == == Haldane in Berlin == [[File:Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany - 1902.jpg|thumb|upright=0.8|Wilhelm II.]] [[File:Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany - 1902.jpg|thumb|upright=0.8|Wilhelm II.]] Accompanied by his nephew J. B. S. Haldane and von Cassel, Haldane traveled to Germany under the guise of a university matter. He arrived on February 8, 1912 in Berlin.<ref>T. G. Otte: ''Statesman of Europe: A Life of Sir Edward Grey.'' Allen Lane, London, 2020, p. 432.</ref> There he first had a friendly initial meeting with Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg.<ref>Wolfgang Mommsen: ''Großmachtstellung und Weltpolitik 1870–1914. Die Außenpolitik des Deutschen Reiches.'' Berlin 1993, p. 234.</ref> Accompanied by his nephew [[J. B. S. Haldane]] and von Cassel, Haldane traveled to Germany under the guise of a university matter. He arrived on February 8, 1912 in Berlin.<ref>T. G. Otte: ''Statesman of Europe: A Life of Sir Edward Grey.'' Allen Lane, London, 2020, p. 432.</ref> There he first had a friendly initial meeting with Chancellor [[Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg|Bethmann Hollweg]].<ref>Wolfgang Mommsen: ''Großmachtstellung und Weltpolitik 1870–1914. Die Außenpolitik des Deutschen Reiches.'' Berlin 1993, p. 234.</ref>

The following day, Haldane met with Kaiser Wilhelm II for lunch, followed by a discussion between him, Kaiser Wilhelm II, and Admiral Tirpitz.<ref>E. L. Woodward: ''Great Britain and the German Navy.'' Routledge, London 1935, p. 331.</ref> Tirpitz remained inflexible and refused to abandon the naval expansion under any circumstances; he was at most willing to temporarily suspend and extend the construction program. He offered to postpone the start of construction of the first additional ship until 1913, rather than 1912. Tirpitz presented Haldane with a number of reasons that (in his view) made it impossible for Germany to abandon the naval expansion. Haldane, who, according to Wolfgang Mommsen's interpretation, saw himself as an emissary tasked with exploratory talks and initially only supposed to ascertain the German side's offers, made no comment on this.<ref>Klaus Hildebrand: ''Das Vergangene Reich: Deutsche Außenpolitik von Bismarck bis Hitler 1871-1945.'' De Gruyter Ouldenbourg, München 2008, p. 273.</ref> From Mommsen's perspective, this was a mistake, as Wilhelm and Tirpitz gained the (erroneous) impression that their meager concessions were already sufficient.<ref>Wolfgang Mommsen: ''Großmachtstellung und Weltpolitik 1870–1914. Die Außenpolitik des Deutschen Reiches.'' Berlin 1993, p. 235.</ref> According to the German historian Rainer F. Schmidt, however, Haldane was concerned with the specific demand for "a waiver of the planned three additional battleships or at least a slowdown of the German construction program to twelve instead of six".<ref>Rainer F. Schmidt: ''Kaiserdämmerung: Berlin, London, Paris, St. Petersburg und der Weg in den Untergang.'' Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 2021, ISBN 978-3-608-11683-0 (E-Book), p. 629.</ref> During the negotiations, the British side (including Haldane himself) assured France that the ongoing negotiations were about détente, not about an alliance with Germany against France.<ref>Christopher Clark: ''The Sleepwalkers. How Europe Went to War in 1914.'' Allen Lane, London u. a. 2012, p. 319 f.</ref> The following day, Haldane met with Kaiser [[Wilhelm II]] for lunch, followed by a discussion between him, Kaiser Wilhelm II, and Admiral Tirpitz.<ref>E. L. Woodward: ''Great Britain and the German Navy.'' Routledge, London 1935, p. 331.</ref> Tirpitz remained inflexible and refused to abandon the naval expansion under any circumstances; he was at most willing to temporarily suspend and extend the construction program. He offered to postpone the start of construction of the first additional ship until 1913, rather than 1912. Tirpitz presented Haldane with a number of reasons that (in his view) made it impossible for Germany to abandon the naval expansion. Haldane, who, according to Wolfgang Mommsen's interpretation, saw himself as an emissary tasked with exploratory talks and initially only supposed to ascertain the German side's offers, made no comment on this.<ref>Klaus Hildebrand: ''Das Vergangene Reich: Deutsche Außenpolitik von Bismarck bis Hitler 1871-1945.'' De Gruyter Ouldenbourg, München 2008, p. 273.</ref> From Mommsen's perspective, this was a mistake, as Wilhelm and Tirpitz gained the (erroneous) impression that their meager concessions were already sufficient.<ref>Wolfgang Mommsen: ''Großmachtstellung und Weltpolitik 1870–1914. Die Außenpolitik des Deutschen Reiches.'' Berlin 1993, p. 235.</ref> According to the German historian Rainer F. Schmidt, however, Haldane was concerned with the specific demand for "a waiver of the planned three additional battleships or at least a slowdown of the German construction program to twelve instead of six".<ref>Rainer F. Schmidt: ''Kaiserdämmerung: Berlin, London, Paris, St. Petersburg und der Weg in den Untergang.'' Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 2021, ISBN 978-3-608-11683-0 (E-Book), p. 629.</ref> During the negotiations, the British side (including Haldane himself) assured France that the ongoing negotiations were about détente, not about an alliance with Germany against France.<ref>Christopher Clark: ''The Sleepwalkers. How Europe Went to War in 1914.'' Allen Lane, London u. a. 2012, p. 319 f.</ref>

That evening, Haldane met again with Bethmann Hollweg on Wilhelmstrasse.<ref>John C. G. Röhl: ''Wilhelm II: Into the Abyss of War and Exile, 1900–1941'' Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2017, p. 853 f.</ref> Exploratory talks on colonial agreements and the Baghdad Railway went well. The key issue, a mutual neutrality agreement in the event of a European war, again failed to reach a definitive agreement. Haldane proposed a political formula in which both powers would commit themselves not to launch an unprovoked attack against each other and not to join any alliances that were aggressive towards the other. Germany, however, insisted on a guarantee of neutrality. Haldane returned to London on February 10. Bethmann Hollweg gave him a confidential copy of the planned new naval amendment. <ref>T. G. Otte: ''Statesman of Europe: A Life of Sir Edward Grey.'' Allen Lane, London, 2020, p. 433.</ref> That evening, Haldane met again with Bethmann Hollweg on Wilhelmstrasse.<ref>John C. G. Röhl: ''Wilhelm II: Into the Abyss of War and Exile, 1900–1941'' Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2017, p. 853 f.</ref> Exploratory talks on colonial agreements and the Baghdad Railway went well. The key issue, a mutual neutrality agreement in the event of a European war, again failed to reach a definitive agreement. Haldane proposed a political formula in which both powers would commit themselves not to launch an unprovoked attack against each other and not to join any alliances that were aggressive towards the other. Germany, however, insisted on a guarantee of neutrality. Haldane returned to London on February 10. Bethmann Hollweg gave him a confidential copy of the planned new naval amendment. <ref>T. G. Otte: ''Statesman of Europe: A Life of Sir Edward Grey.'' Allen Lane, London, 2020, p. 433.</ref>